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Abstract—Popular services such as Doodle Mobile and Tymelie
are extremely useful planning tools that enable mobile-phone
users to determine common meeting time(s) for events. Similar
planning tools for determining optimal meeting locations, based
on the location preferences of the users, are highly desirable
for event planning and management in popular mobile phone
applications, such as taxi sharing, route planning and mobile
participatory sensing. Yet, they have received very little attention
by researchers. An important, and often overlooked, facet of
such planning applications is the privacy of the participating
users and their preferences; users want to agree on a meeting
location without necessarily revealing their location preferences
to the service provider or to the other users. In this paper,
we address the problem of privacy-preserving optimal meeting-
location computation, especially focusing on its applicability to
current mobile devices and applications. We ﬁrst deﬁne the notion
of privacy in such computations. Second, we model the problem
of optimal meeting-location computation as a privacy-preserving
k-center problem and we design two solutions; both solutions
take advantage of the homomorphic properties of well-known
cryptosystems by Boneh-Goh-Nissim, ElGamal and Paillier in
order to perform oblivious computations. Third, we implement
the proposed solutions on a testbed of the latest generation Nokia
mobile devices and study their performance. Finally, we assess
the utility and expectations, in terms of privacy and usability,
of the proposed solutions by means of a targeted survey and
user-study of mobile-phone users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology used in mobile devices has come a long way
since the introduction of GSM, almost two decades ago.
Wide-area broadband connectivity and miniaturization enable
lightweight smartphones to be used increasingly as personal
computers, which makes them a critical tool for improving
the efﬁciency of service-oriented businesses. A recent survey
shows that 37% of IT organizations are planning to signiﬁ-
cantly increase their spendings for mobile devices and their
support, and almost 48% of the IT companies recognize that
mobile devices and applications are critical for their business
processes [1].
One such important application/service for mobile devices
is activity management. For example, activity management
applications such as Microsoft Outlook [2], Apple iCal [3] and
Doodle [4], are becoming increasingly popular [5]. Colleagues
can use these applications on their mobile devices to organize
business meetings, groups of friends can organize parties on
weekends and people unbeknownst to each other can get dating
recommendations based on their common time availabilities.
Calendar sharing and automatic meeting scheduling, based on
common time availabilities, are the two main features of such
applications and services.
Although current activity management applications focus
primarily on time-related scheduling, little attention has been
devoted to the spatial constraints. Determining a suitable
location of a meeting or activity is as important as identifying
the commonly acceptable time slot. Several providers already
offer variants of this service (such as ﬁnding the location
that is in the middle between two user-deﬁned locations)
either as on-line web applications ([6], [7], [8]) or as stand-
alone applications for mobile devices [9]. Not only is such
a feature desirable, but it also increases both the efﬁciency
and the productivity of all the involved parties. For instance,
companies could set cost-minimizing travel policies, such that
meeting locations are optimized with respect to travel time or
distance for each participant, and colleagues would not need to
manually search and unanimously agree for a suitable meeting
location. Moreover, preferences of companies and employees
would be taken into consideration, and the overall meeting
costs would be optimized.
One important aspect of such a service is the privacy of
users’ meeting location preferences. Let us explain this by
means of a practical example. Assume representatives of three
competing companies X,Y and Z are exploring new regions
for proﬁtable business opportunities. If these representatives of
X,Y and Z would need to meet, it is very likely that none of
them would like to reveal their strategic interest in a position.
In other words, they would like to conceal the association
between the meeting participants and their preferred meeting
locations. Yet, they would like to ﬁnd a place that is easy
to reach for all of them. In such a scenario, determining
the optimal meeting place while preserving the privacy of
individuals’ preferred locations is of utmost importance. For
instance, a global telecom operator recently announced a taxi-
sharing application [10], where the users have to reveal their
departure and destination points to the server. If such a server
is not fully trusted by the users, revealing sensitive locations
(such as users home/work addresses) could pave the way for
ﬁnancial and social inference attacks by third-parties.
Popular meeting scheduling services, such as Doodle [4]
or Outlook [2], require each participant to indicate his time
availabilities in order to ﬁnd a common time slot. Clearly, in
such services, third-party providers and other participants can
ﬁnd out the private schedule information of other participants.
If providers offered to ﬁnd the optimal meeting location in a
similar fashion, they would need to know each participant’s
personal location preferences, which would pose an even
greater privacy risk. For instance, if Doodle users were asked
to introduce their preferred location in addition to their time
availabilities, it would be even easier to abusively track them
and proﬁle their habits and mobility patterns. As an example,
a popular service offering real street images has been used in
a divorce case [11] by a spouse against her husband (after he
denied being where he was ﬁlmed). Undoubtedly, the privacy
of users’ personal information is a very sensitive issue, and
people are increasingly worried about data disclosure risks
and their negative social and ﬁnancial consequences.
Although there is a strong correlation between time and
space dimensions (e.g., a person’s location is closely corre-
lated with the time of the day), transposing the mechanisms
developed for time scheduling to location determination is very
challenging. In the scheduling scenario, for instance, users
specify whether they are available or not for each known
time slot, and the common availabilities are then computed by
aggregating the individual schedules. The common availabil-
ities are then obtained simply by checking whether all users
are available in a given time slot. Determining the optimal
meeting location, on the contrary, is not as straightforward.
For instance, in the space domain users can choose the
precision of their coordinates, depending on their level of
anonymity, by providing only an approximate region or a
highly populated public space. Moreover, a meeting location
might not be one of the locations that each user proposes but,
on the contrary, it might be a different location that is easily
reachable by all participants, and therefore simply aggregating
the individual locations might not result in an optimal meeting
place. Clearly, as the approach of the time-scheduling problem
is fundamentally different from the optimal meeting-location
problem, solutions to the former cannot be directly applied to
the latter. Additionally, the privacy requirements of hiding the
location preferences from the computing party and the other
participants make this problem even more challenging.
Our work: In this work, we address the problem of
ﬁnding the optimal meeting location in a way that preserves
the privacy of users’ personal location preferences vis-a`-vis
other users and any third-parties that might be involved. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that presents
solutions to the privacy-preserving optimal meeting-location
problem. Moreover, the design of such solutions is particularly
targeted at mobile devices, with limited computational and
communication capabilities. The proposed application is inde-
pendent of any underlying service or network provider, and
it can be included in an existing online meeting management
services as an add-on feature.
Previous research on related problems, albeit without the
privacy considerations, has been carried out mostly in the
operations research domain, where the challenge is to ﬁnd
an optimal location (for a warehouse, an ATM machine or a
power plant) that minimizes a given cost function (longest dis-
tance, shortest time or best connectivity). The purpose of such
solutions is purely an optimization goal, without any require-
ments on the privacy front, mostly because solutions are found
in-house, without involving a potentially untrusted third-party
or external partners. However, when considering independent
users with private information, such solutions based on re-
vealing location preferences to a central entity are no longer
applicable or desired. Untrusted infrastructure and potentially
competing partners represent two crucial distinguishing factors
with respect to the pure optimization techniques studied in
operation research. Privacy-preserving schemes, although only
for time scheduling, have received signiﬁcant attention from
the research community, and several algorithms that preserve
the privacy of individual availabilities have been developed.
Protocols based on secure multiparty computation [12] and
distributed constraint satisfaction problems ([13], [14]) have
been designed and evaluated with respect to the privacy guar-
antees they offer. Nevertheless, as time scheduling and location
determination are two fundamentally different problems, no
such work seems to exist for the privacy-preserving meeting
location problem.
Contributions: In this paper, we design the ﬁrst privacy-
preserving, optimal meeting-location service for mobile de-
vices. The main contributions of this work are:
• Two novel algorithms for the privacy-preserving optimal
meeting-location (POML) problem
• A formal framework for representing privacy require-
ments in the POML problem and analysis of the privacy
provided by the proposed algorithms
• Implementation of the proposed algorithms on mobile
devices, including the ﬁrst known implementation of the
Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption scheme [15] used in one
of the algorithms.
• Extensive performance measurements of the proposed
solution on a test-bed of commercial mobile devices, as
well as a targeted user-study on mobile-phone users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we describe the system architecture and threat model, whereas
in Section III we deﬁne the privacy-preserving meeting-
location problem and the privacy requirements. In Section
IV we present and analyze our solution, and in Section V
we present its implementation on mobile devices and the
performance results. In Section VI we discuss the security and
optimization extensions to our solutions, and in Section VII
we present the results of our user-study. In Section VIII we
discuss the related work and we conclude the paper in Section
IX.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we outline the network and threat models
that are considered in the paper.
A. System Model
Our system is composed of two main entities: (i) a set of
users1 (or mobile devices) U = {u1, . . . , uN} and (ii) a third-
party service provider, called Location Determination Server
(LDS). The N users want to determine the optimal meeting
location that is computed by the LDS.
Each user’s mobile device is assumed to be able to establish
communication with the LDS either directly or through a ﬁxed
infrastructure, such as the Internet. The mobile devices are
able to perform public-key cryptographic operations, such as
encryption, decryption and digital signature. Moreover, we
assume that each user ui ∈ U has means of determining
the position Li = (xi, yi) ∈ N2 of his preferred meeting
location (or his own location) by using a common coordinate
system. We consider a two-dimensional position coordinates
system, but the proposed schemes are general enough and can
be easily extended to three dimensions. These coordinates can
be mapped from/to real geographic coordinates, either locally
(using a GPS receiver on his mobile device) or through an
optional third-party positioning service (PS), such as Google
My Location [16]. For instance, such deﬁnition of Li can
be made fully compliant with the UTM coordinate system
[17], which is a plane coordinate system where points are
represented as a 2-tuple of positive values (distances in meters
from a given reference point). As UTM divides the globe in
grid zones, our solution applies best to such regional scenarios.
We deﬁne the set of the preferred meeting locations of all
users as L = {Li}Ni=1. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a
ﬂat-Earth model and we consider line-of-sight Euclidian dis-
tances between preferred meeting locations. Even though the
actual real-world distance (road, railway, boat, etc.) between
two locations is at least as large as their Euclidian distance,
the proportion between distances in the real world is assumed
to be correlated with the proportion of the respective Euclidian
distances.
We assume that each of the N users has his own pub-
lic/private key pair (KuiP ,K
ui
s ), certiﬁed by a trusted CA,
which is used to digitally sign the messages that are sent to the
1Throughout this paper, we use the words users and devices interchange-
ably. The meaning is clear from the context, unless stated otherwise.
LDS. Moreover, we assume that the N users share a common
secret that is utilized to generate a shared public/private key
pair (KMvP ,K
Mv
s ) in an online fashion for each meeting setup
instance v. The private key KMvs generated in this way is
known only to all meeting participants, whereas the public key
KMvP is known to everyone including the LDS. This could be
achieved through a secure credential establishment protocol
such as in ([18], [19], [20]).
The LDS executes the optimal meeting-location algorithm
on the inputs it receives by the users in order to compute the
optimal meeting location. The LDS is also able to perform
public-key cryptographic functions. For instance, a common
public-key infrastructure using the RSA cryptosystem [21]
could be employed. Let KLDSP be the public key, certiﬁed
by a trusted CA, and KLDSs the corresponding private key
of the LDS. KLDSP is publicly known and users encrypt
their input to the meeting-location algorithm using this key;
the encrypted input can be decrypted by the LDS using its
private key KLDSs . This ensures message conﬁdentiality and
integrity for all the messages exchanged between users and
the LDS. For simplicity of exposition, in our protocols we do
not explicitly show these cryptographic operations involving
LDS’s public/private key.
B. Threat Model
a) Location Determination Server: The LDS is the entity
that performs the computations in order to determine the
optimal meeting location for the users. The LDS is assumed
to execute the algorithms correctly, i.e., take all the inputs
and produce the output according to the algorithm. However,
the LDS may try to learn information about user meeting-
location preferences from the received inputs, the intermediate
results and the produced outputs of the meeting-location
computations. This type of adversarial behavior is usually
referred to as honest-but-curious adversary (or semi-honest)
[22]. In most practical settings, where service providers have
a commercial interest in providing a faithful service to their
customers, the assumption of a semi-honest LDS is generally
sufﬁcient.
b) Users: The participating users also want to learn the
private location preferences of other users from the output
of the algorithm they receive from the LDS. We refer to
such attacks as passive attacks. As user inputs are encrypted
with the LDS’s public key KLDSP , there is a conﬁdentiality
guarantee against basic eavesdropping by participants and non
participants. In addition to these passive attacks, participating
users may also attempt to actively attack the protocol by, for
instance, colluding with other users or manipulating their own
inputs to learn the output.
A complete list of symbols can be found in Table I.
III. PROBLEM AND PRIVACY DEFINITIONS
In this section, we deﬁne the privacy-preserving optimal
meeting-location (POML) problem and the necessary privacy
requirements that have to be met by any algorithm that solves
the POML problem.
Table I
TABLE OF SYMBOLS.
SYMBOL DEFINITION 
AdvIDT Identifiability advantage 
Advd-LNK Distance-linkability advantage 
Advc-LNK Coordinate-linkability advantage 
dij 
Euclidian distance between two 
points in the plane 
DiM 
Maximum Euclidian distance of user 
i to any other user j  i 
f Public transformation function based on secret key (for privacy) 
g Optimization function 
LDS Location Determination Server 
Li 
Desired meeting location of user i, 
Li = (xi, yi) 
Lopt Optimal meeting location 
PS Positioning Service 
ua 
Attacker (a user participating in the 
POML protocol) 
E(.) Encryption of (.) (the encryption scheme is clear from the context) 
ElG(.)/ 
Pai(.) 
Encryption of (.) using the 
ElGamal/Paillier encryption scheme 
,  Element-permutation functions 
 
A. Privacy-Preserving Optimal Meeting-Location Problem
In this work, we consider the problem of ﬁnding, in a
privacy-preserving way, the optimal meeting location among
several participants, such that (i) each of the users gets to
know only the ﬁnal optimal location and (ii) no user or third-
party server knows any other private location information
about any user involved in the computations. We refer to
an algorithm that solves such problem as privacy-preserving
optimal meeting-location (POML) algorithm. In general, any
POML algorithm A should work as follows. Given a set of
N users U, where each user ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, has a private
preferred location Li, and a transformation function f , the
POML algorithm takes f(Li), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, as inputs and
computes the location function f(Lopt) as output, where Lopt
is the optimal location as computed by an optimization func-
tion g, given the private inputs f(L1), . . . , f(LN ). Moreover,
the inputs to the algorithm and the outputs it produces should
satisfy the two privacy requirements described earlier. Figure
1 shows a functional diagram of a POML protocol, where the
POML algorithm A is executed by an LDS.
Formally, a POML algorithm A works as follows:
• Input: a transformation f of private locations Li
f(L1)||f(L2)|| . . . ||f(LN )
where f is a one-way public function (based on secret
key) such that it is hard (success with only a negligible
probability) to determine the input Li without knowing
the secret key, by just observing f(Li).
Each user i
Preferred 
meeting location
Li (by GPS or PS)
Transformation 
function f
Location Determination Server
POML algorithm A
Optimization 
function g
f(Li)
f(Lopt) = g(f(L1),...,f(LN))
Inverse 
function f--1
Optimal meeting 
location Lopt
Figure 1. Functional diagram of the POML protocol, where the POML
algorithm is executed by an LDS.
Lopt,a=ga(f(L1)...f(L4))
Lopt,b=gb(f(L1)...f(L4))
Lopt,c=gc(f(L1)...f(L4))
L3 (x3,y3)
L2
(x2,y2)
L4
(x4,y4)L1 (x1,y1)
Figure 2. General POML scenario, where three distinct optimiza-
tion functions ga, gb, gc output three different optimal meeting loca-
tions Lopt,a, Lopt,b, Lopt,c, given the user-preferred meeting locations
L1, . . . , L4.
• Output: an output f(Lopt) = g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN )),
where g is an optimization function and Lopt = (xl, yl) ∈
N
2 is the optimal meeting location that has been selected
for this particular set of users, such that it is hard for
the LDS to determine Lopt by just observing f(Lopt).
Given f(Lopt), each user is able to compute Lopt =
f−1(f(Lopt)) using his local data.
The optimization function g can be deﬁned in several ways,
depending on the preferences of the users, their employers or
policies. For instance, users might prefer to meet in locations
that are close to their ofﬁces, and their employers might
prefer a place that is closest to their clients. Figure 2 shows
three different optimal locations for three distinct optimization
functions g. In Section IV-A we describe one such function
that we use throughout this paper, and in Section VI-B we
discuss other optimization functions that can be used in any
POML algorithm.
B. Privacy Requirements and Deﬁnitions
The generic POML protocol represented in Figure 1 in-
volves several operations, some of which are executed on
the user device and some on a third-party LDS. Moreover,
the PS is optionally required by the users in order to obtain
the location coordinates of POIs in a given area. In order to
guarantee that private information about users is not leaked to
other users or third-parties during the execution of the POML
algorithm, we need to formally deﬁne requirements that any
such algorithm has to satisfy. Afterwards, we will evaluate the
proposed POML algorithms based on these privacy deﬁnitions.
Informally, the privacy requirements can be stated as follows.
After the execution of the POML algorithm, any user ui should
not be able to infer (i) the preferred location Lj of any other
user uj = ui nor (ii) the relative distances dij between any
two users ui = uj . Likewise, any LDS (and PS) should not be
able to infer (iii) the preferred location Li of any user ui, (iv)
the relative distance dij between any two users ui = uj nor
(v) the ﬁnal meeting location Lopt. Such privacy requirements
can be grouped in two components, called as user-privacy and
server-privacy, deﬁned as follows.
1) User-Privacy: The user-privacy of any POML algo-
rithm A measures the probabilistic advantage that an attacker
a (a user participating in the POML protocol or an external
user) gains towards learning the preferred location Lj of at
least one other user j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, except the ﬁnal optimal
meeting location Lopt, after all users have participated in the
execution of the POML protocol. Clearly, an external user does
not learn about any preferred locations as it does not receive
the output of the algorithm. Therefore, we only consider the
non-trivial case of users participating in the POML protocol
as attackers, i.e., ua where a ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
We express the user-privacy in terms of three adversary
advantages. First, we measure the identiﬁability advantage,
which is the probabilistic advantage of ua in correctly guess-
ing the preferred location Li of any user ui = ua. We
denote it as AdvIDTa (A). Second, we measure the distance-
linkability advantage, which is the probabilistic advantage of
ua in correctly guessing whether the distance dij between
any two users ui = uj , is greater than a given parameter
s, without necessarily knowing any users’ preferred locations
Li, Lj . We denote this advantage as Advd−LNKa . Finally, we
measure the coordinate-linkability advantage, which is the
probabilistic advantage of ua in correctly guessing whether
a given coordinate xi (or yi) of a user ui is greater than
the corresponding coordinate(s) of another user uj = ui, i.e.,
xj (or yj), without necessarily knowing any users’ preferred
locations Li, Lj . We denote this advantage as Advc−LNKa . The
next observation follows from the above deﬁnitions.
Observation 1: If an adversary has an identiﬁability advan-
tage over any two distinct users ui = uj , this implies it has
distance- and coordinate-linkability advantages over those two
users as well. However, the inverse is not necessarily true.
We semantically deﬁne the identiﬁability and linkability
advantages by using a challenge-response methodology, which
has been widely used to prove the security of cryptographic
protocols. We now describe such a challenge-response game
for the identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTa (A) of any adversary
ua in a POML algorithm A.
1) Initialization: Challenger privately collects L = {Li}Ni=1,
where Li = (xi, yi) is the preferred meeting location of
user ui, and f(Li), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2) POML algorithm: Challenger executes the POML algo-
rithm A with the N users and computes f(Lopt) =
g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN )). It then sends f(Lopt) to each user
ui, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
3) Challenger randomly chooses a user ua, a ∈ {1, . . . , N},
as the adversary.
4) ua chooses uj = ua and sends j to the challenger.
5) Challenge: Challenger chooses a random
k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, k = a and sends Lk to the adversary.
The challenge is to correctly guess whether Lk = Lj .
6) The adversary sends L∗j to the challenger. If the adversary
thinks that Lk is the preferred meeting location of user
uj , i.e., if Lk = Lj then the adversary sets L∗j = 1. If
the adversary thinks that Lk is not the preferred meeting
location of user uj , then he sets L∗j = 0.
The identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTa (A) can be deﬁned as
AdvIDTa (A) = |Pr[(L∗j = 1 ∧ Lk = Lj)∪
(L∗j = 0 ∧ Lk = Lj)]− 1/(N − 1)|
where Pr[L∗j = Lk] is the probability of user ua winning the
game by correctly answering the challenge, computed over
the coin tosses of the challenger, L∗j is ua’s guess about the
preferred location of user uj = ua, Lk is the preferred location
of user uk = ua and 1/(N −1) is the probability of a random
guess.
Similarly, we deﬁne the distance-linkability advantage
Advd−LNKa (A) of any adversary ua in a POML algorithm
A by means of the following challenger-adversary game.
1) Initialization: Challenger privately collects L = {Li}Ni=1,
where Li = (xi, yi) is the preferred meeting location of
user ui, and f(Li), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2) POML algorithm: Challenger executes the POML algo-
rithm A with the N users and computes f(Lopt) =
g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN )). It then sends f(Lopt) to each user
ui, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
3) Challenger randomly chooses a user ua, a ∈ {1, . . . , N},
as the adversary.
4) ua chooses uj , uk = ua and sends (j, k) to the challenger.
5) Challenge: Challenger computes a value s,
e.g., the average Euclidian distance d =∑N−1
n=1
∑N
m=n+1 dnm/(2N(N − 1)) between any
two users un = um, and sends (j, k, s) to the adversary.
The challenge is to correctly guess whether djk < s.
6) The adversary sends d∗ to the challenger. If the adversary
thinks that djk < s then he sets d∗ = 1, otherwise d∗ = 0.
The adversary wins the game if: (i) d∗ = 1 ∧ djk < s or
(ii) d∗ = 0 ∧ djk ≥ s. Otherwise, the adversary loses.
The distance-linkability advantage Advd−LNKa (A) can be
deﬁned as
Advd−LNKa (A) = |Pr[(d∗ = 1 ∧ djk < s)∨
(d∗ = 0 ∧ djk ≥ s)]− 1
2
|
where Pr[.] is the probability of the adversary ua winning the
game by correctly answering the challenge, computed over the
coin tosses of the challenger, d∗ is the guess of the adversary,
djk is the distance between Lj , Lk and s is a parameter chosen
by the challenger.
Finally, we deﬁne the coordinate-linkability advantage
Advc−LNKa (A) of any adversary ua in a POML algorithm
A by means of the following challenger-adversary game.
1) Initialization: Challenger privately collects L = {Li}Ni=1,
where Li = (xi, yi) is the preferred meeting location of
user ui, and f(Li), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2) POML algorithm: Challenger executes the POML algo-
rithm A with the N users and computes f(Lopt) =
g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN )). It then sends f(Lopt) to each user
ui, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
3) Challenger randomly chooses a user ua, a ∈ {1, . . . , N},
as the adversary.
4) ua chooses uj , uk = ua and sends (j, k) to the challenger.
5) Challenge: Challenger chooses a coordinate axis c ∈
{x, y} and sends (j, k, c) to the adversary. The challenge
is to correctly guess whether cj < ck.
6) The adversary sends c∗ to the challenger. If the adversary
thinks that cj < ck then he sets c∗ = 1, otherwise c∗ = 0.
The adversary wins the game if: (i) c∗ = 1 ∧ cj < ck or
(ii) c∗ = 0 ∧ cj ≥ ck. Otherwise, the adversary loses.
The coordinate-linkability advantage Advc−LNKa (A) can be
deﬁned as
Advc−LNKa (A) = |Pr[(c∗ = 1 ∧ cj < ck)∨
(c∗ = 0 ∧ cj ≥ ck)]− 1
2
|
where Pr[.] is the probability of the adversary ua winning the
game by correctly answering the challenge, computed over the
coin tosses of the challenger, c∗ is the guess of the adversary,
cj is the spatial coordinate (xj or yj) randomly chosen by the
challenger. ua sets c∗ = 1 if he thinks cj − ck < s, otherwise
c∗ = 0.
We now deﬁne the user-privacy of any POML algorithm A
on a per-execution basis in the following way.
Deﬁnition 1: An execution of the POML algorithm A
is user-private if the identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTa (A),
the distance-linkability advantage Advc−LNKa (A) and the
coordinate-linkability advantage Advc−LNKa (A) of each par-
ticipating user ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} are negligible in the number
of user-preferred meeting locations Li.
In general, a function f(x) is called negligible if, for any
positive polynomial p(x), there is an integer B such that
for any integer x > B, |f(x)| < 1/p(x) [22]. According to
Deﬁnition 1, an execution of the POML algorithm is user-
private if and only if any user ua does not gain any (actually,
negligible) additional knowledge about the preferred meeting
locations Lj of any other user uj = ua, except the value of
the ﬁnal optimal meeting location Lopt.
2) Server-Privacy: The server-privacy of any POML al-
gorithm A measures the probabilistic advantage that the LDS
gains in learning the preferred meeting locations Li of any
user ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. As in the case of user-privacy,
we express the server-privacy by means of three advantages.
First, we measure the probabilistic advantage of an LDS in
correctly guessing the preferred location Li of any user ui,
called identiﬁability advantage and denoted as AdvIDTLDS(A).
Second, we measure the probabilistic advantage of an LDS in
correctly guessing whether the distance dij between any two
users ui = uj is greater than a given parameter s, without
necessarily knowing any users’ preferred locations Li, Lj . We
call this the distance-linkability advantage and we denote
it as Advd−LNKLDS (A). Third, we measure the probabilistic
advantage in correctly guessing whether a given coordinate
xi (or yi) is greater than the same coordinate of another
user j = i, i.e., xj (or yj), without necessarily knowing any
users’ preferred locations Li, Lj . We call this the coordinate-
linkability advantage and we denote it as Advc−LNKLDS (A).
The server identiﬁability and linkability advantages are
deﬁned in a similar fashion as the user advantages, and are
presented in Appendix A. The server-privacy of a POML
algorithm A on a per-execution basis can then be deﬁned as
follows.
Deﬁnition 2: An execution of the POML algorithm A is
server-private if the identiﬁability advantage AdvIDTLDS(A), the
distance-linkability advantage Advc−LNKLDS and the coordinate-
linkability advantage Advc−LNKLDS of an LDS are negligible.
However, it is reasonable to assume that in practice users
will be able to perform multiple executions of the POML
protocol, possibly with different sets of participating users
at each time. This is particularly true if such a meeting-
location service is offered, for instance, by providers to their
subscribers. As a consequence, privacy of a POML should be
deﬁned over multiple executions.
3) POML Privacy: We now formally express the privacy
conditions that any POML algorithm A has to satisfy, based
on the above deﬁnitions. First, we deﬁne a private execution
of a POML algorithm as follows.
Deﬁnition 3: A private execution of any POML algorithm
A is an execution which does not reveal more information than
what can be derived from the inputs, the intermediate results
and its output.
Based on how memory is retained over sequential execu-
tions, we deﬁne two types of algorithm executions, namely,
dependent and independent.
Deﬁnition 4: An independent (respectively dependent) ex-
ecution is a single private execution of the POML algorithm
deﬁned in Section III-A in which no (respectively some)
information of an earlier and current execution is retained and
passed to future executions.
The information that might be transferred from an earlier
execution to the next can include past inputs to the algo-
rithm, intermediate results (on the LDS) and the outputs of
the algorithm. Based on the type of execution, the privacy
conditions of a privacy-preserving meeting-location algorithm
can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5: A meeting-location algorithm A is execution
(respectively fully) privacy-preserving if and only if for every
independent (respectively all) execution(s)
1) A is correct; All users are correctly able to compute the
ﬁnal optimal meeting location Lopt;
2) A is user-private;
3) A is server-private.
A fully privacy-preserving meeting-location (POML) algo-
rithm is a much stronger (and difﬁcult to achieve) privacy re-
quirement. In this ﬁrst work, we focus on achieving execution
privacy. The relationship between a fully POML and execution
POML algorithm is given by the following observation.
Observation 2: Any POML algorithm A, as deﬁned in
Section III-A, is execution privacy-preserving if it is fully
privacy-preserving, but the inverse is not true.
In the next section, we present our solutions to the POML
problem and analyze them with respect to their complexity
and privacy aspects.
IV. SOLUTIONS AND ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we have deﬁned the fundamental
building blocks that constitute a POML problem, both from
a functional perspective (as in Figure 1) and from a privacy
context. From a practical point of view, however, the problem
is to design speciﬁc solutions and protocols that can be
implemented on existing commercial mobile devices. In order
to achieve the integration between resource-constrained mobile
devices and the existing client-server network paradigm, our
solutions have to be efﬁcient in terms of computations and
communication complexities, while taking advantage of the
increasingly available mobile broadband. Such criteria have to
be carefully considered when choosing the optimization and
transformation functions g and f , respectively.
In this section, we present our solution to the POML
problem as follows. First, we discuss the mathematical tools
that we use in order to model the optimization function g and
the transformation functions f . In the following subsections,
we deﬁne the optimization function g by taking advantage of
the properties of three well-known cryptographic primitives
that are used to implement the transformation function f .
These primitives, in turn, will guarantee that no private in-
formation about the preferred locations of any user is leaked
to any other user or third-party involved in the computations.
Finally, by merging the f and g components of the POML
algorithm, we design our complete POML protocol. We then
analytically evaluate its privacy properties and its computation
and communication complexities.
In order to separate the optimization part of the POML
algorithm A from its implementation using cryptographic
primitives, we ﬁrst discuss the optimization function g and
then the transformation function f .
A. Optimization Function g
In order to determine an optimal meeting location, there
are several factors that need to be considered. First, the
optimality criterion needs to consider the spatial constraints
present in the problem. For example, a meeting location
Lopt = (xl, yl) among N users U = {ui}Ni=1 might be optimal
when all users can reach Lopt in a “fair” amount of time.
Another criterion might be to minimize the total displacement
of all users in order to reach Lopt, or simply making sure
that no user is “too far” from Lopt with respect to another
user. Second, computing an optimal meeting location in a
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Figure 3. POML scenario, where the optimization function is g =
argmin(maxi DMi ). The dashed arrows represent the maximum distance
DMi from each user ui to any user j = i, whereas the solid line is the
minimum of all such maximum distances. The optimal meeting location is
Lopt = L2 = (x2, y2).
privacy-preserving way requires g to perform optimization
operations in an oblivious fashion, by taking into account
the properties of appropriate cryptographic schemes. Features
such as homomorphic encryption and semantic security are of
particular interest in this work, as they allow operations on the
plain text components to be accomplished by computations on
encrypted elements (homomorphic encryption), while ensuring
that two identical plain-text components are encrypted in
indistinguishable and unlinkable ciphertext elements (semantic
security).
In this work, we consider the optimality criterion that
has been widely used in operations research to solve the k-
center problem. In the k-center problem, the goal is to ﬁnd
L1, . . . , Lk locations among N given possible places, in order
to optimally place k facilities, such that the maximum distance
from any place to its closest facility is minimized. For a
two dimensional coordinate system, the Euclidian distance
metric is usually employed. As the POML problem consists in
determining the optimal meeting location from a set of user-
desired locations, we focus on the k-center formulation of the
problem with k = 1. This choice is also grounded on the fact
that not choosing Lopt from one of the location preferences
L1, . . . , LN might potentially result in a location Lopt that
is not suited for the kind of meeting that the participants
require. Usually, a business meeting has different logistics
requirements than a student party, and therefore the k-center
formulation ensures that the ﬁnal optimal location is a location
that has been proposed by one of the participants. Figure 3
shows an example POML scenario modeled as a k-center
problem, where four users want to determine the optimal
meeting location Lopt.
In order to formally deﬁne the POML problem using the
k-center formulation, we need to introduce the following
notation.
• dij ≥ 0 is the Euclidian distance between two points
Li, Lj ∈ N2
• DMi = maxj =i dij is the maximum distance from Li to
any other point Lj (j = i).
Based on such notation, we can now formally deﬁne the
POML problem as follows.
Deﬁnition 6: The Privacy-preserving Optimal Location
(POML) problem is to determine a location Lopt such that
Lopt ∈ L = {L1, . . . , LN}, where opt = argmin
i
DMi
In other words, solving the POML problem is equivalent
to ﬁnding the optimal meeting location, among the set of
proposed (and user-desired) locations, such that the distance of
the furthest desired location to the optimal one is minimized.
There are two important steps involved in the computation
of the optimal location Lopt. The ﬁrst step is to compute
the pairwise distances dij among all users i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
participating in the POML algorithm. The second step requires
the computations of the maximum and minimum values of
such distances. Before proceeding with these computations,
in the following subsection we examine the features provided
by the cryptographic functions that will ensure the privacy of
individual user-desired locations Li, ∀i = 1, . . . , N .
B. Transformation Functions f
The optimization function g, as deﬁned in the previous
subsection, requires the computation of two functions of the
private user-desired locations Li, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}: (i) a
function that computes the distance between any two locations
Li = Lj and (ii) a function that minimizes the maximum of
these distances. In order to achieve the ﬁnal result and preserve
the privacy of the personal information, we need to rely on
computationally secure functions that possess the features that
are required for such computations.
There are several cryptographic schemes that can be used,
but not all of them provide the same features. We are interested
in using secure schemes that allow us to compute the Euclidian
distance between two points in the plane and the maximiza-
tion/minimization functions. In our protocol, we consider three
such encryption schemes: the Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) [15],
the ElGamal [23] and the Paillier [24] public-key encryption
schemes.
Speciﬁcally, we are interested in the homomorphic proper-
ties of these schemes, such as the multiplicative and additive
properties, as well as the randomness in the encryption.
Given two plaintexts m1,m2 with their respective encryp-
tions E(m1), E(m2), the multiplicative property states that
E(m1)	E(m2) = E(m1 ·m2), where 	 is an arithmetic op-
eration in the encrypted domain that is equivalent to the usual
multiplication operation in the plaintext domain. The additive
homomorphic property states that E(m1)⊕E(m2) = E(m1+
m2), where ⊕ is an arithmetic operation in the encrypted
domain which is equivalent to the usual sum operation in the
plaintext domain. The randomness in the encryption ensures
that even if m1 = m2, E(m1) = E(m2) if two distinct
random numbers are used for the encryption. We now brieﬂy
describe such homomorphic properties of the three encryption
schemes BGN, ElGamal and Paillier. For conciseness, we omit
the details of the initialization and operation of these schemes,
which can be found in the respective references.
a) BGN: Given two plaintexts m1,m2 ∈ Z∗T (where
T < q and q is a large prime) with their respective encryptions
E(m1), E(m2), the BGN possesses the following multiplica-
tive and additive homomorphic properties
E(m1 ·m2) = e(E(m1), E(m2)) · hr1 mod n
E(m1 +m2) = E(m1) · E(m2) · hr mod n
where e : G×G → G1 is an admissible bilinear map, G,G1
are two bilinear groups of composite order n = pq (p, q are
two large primes), h, g are public, h1 = e(g, h) and r ∈ Zn is
a random integer. BGN is an elliptic curve-based scheme and
therefore much shorter keys can be used compared to ElGamal
and RSA. A 160-bit key in elliptic curve cryptosystems is gen-
erally believed to provide equivalent security as a 1024-bit key
in RSA and ElGamal [25]. However, due to the construction
of the BGN scheme, only one homomorphic multiplication on
each encrypted element is allowed, whereas an inﬁnite number
of homomorphic additions can be performed.
b) Paillier: Given m1,m2 ∈ Z∗n, it can be veriﬁed
that the Paillier encryption scheme satisﬁes the following
multiplicative and additive homomorphic properties
E(m1 ·m2) = Er(m1)m2 mod n2
E(m1 +m2) = Er1(m1) · Er1(m2) mod n2
where ri, r ∈ Z∗n are random integers and n = pq where p, q
are two large primes.
c) ElGamal: Given m1,m2 ∈ Z∗n, where n is a large
prime, the ElGamal encryption schemes satisﬁes the following
multiplicative property
E(m1 ·m2) = E(m1) · E(m2) mod n
Based on the three aforementioned encryption schemes, we
now describe the distance computation algorithms that are used
in our solution.
C. Distance Computations
Computing the pairwise distance dij between any two user-
desired locations Li, Lj is the main requirement for solving
the POML problem. In order to determine the optimal meeting
location, we need to ﬁnd the location Lopt, where opt ∈
{1, . . . , N}, that minimizes the maximum distance between
any user-desired location and Lopt. In our algorithms, we work
with the square of the distances, as they are much easier
to compute in an oblivious fashion using the homomorphic
properties of the cryptographic schemes. The problem of
ﬁnding the argument that minimizes the maximum distance
is equivalent to ﬁnding the argument that minimizes the
maximum distance squared (provided that all distances are
greater than 1).
Hereafter we propose two distance computation modules
that will be used in our POML protocol. Each of these modules
computes the square of all pairwise distances between any two
user-desired locations, and preserves the privacy of each user’s
preferred location Li, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
1. Each user i generates
Ei(a) = <ai1|...|ai6> = 
< E(xi2) | E(T-2xi) | E(1) |
E(T-2yi) | E(yi2) | E(1) >
Ei(b) = <bi1|...|bi6> = 
< E(1) | E(xi) | E(xi2) |
E(yi) | E(1) | E(yi2) >
2. Server computes
For i =1...N-1
For j = i+1…N
For k = 1...6
choose random r  Zn
cij,k = e(aik,bjk)·hr
end for
cijtot = cij,1· ...· cij,6
end for
end for       
Ei(a),
Ei(b)
Users LDS
Figure 4. Distance computation protocol based on the BGN encryption
scheme.
1) BGN-distance: The ﬁrst distance computation algo-
rithm is based on the BGN encryption scheme and is shown
in Figure 4. This novel protocol requires only one round
of communication between each user and the LDS, and it
efﬁciently uses both the multiplicative and additive homomor-
phic properties of the BGN scheme. The algorithm works as
follows. In step 1, each user ui, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} creates the
vectors
Ei(a) =< ai1| . . . |ai6 >
=< E(x2i )|E(T − 2xi)|E(1)|E(T − 2yi)|E(y2i )|E(1) >
Ei(b) =< bi1| . . . |bi6 >
=< E(1)|E(xi)|E(x2i )|E(yi)|E(1)|E(y2i ) >
where E(.) is the encryption of (.) using the BGN scheme
and Li = (xi, yi) is the desired meeting location of user ui.
Afterwards, each user sends the two vectors Ei(a), Ei(b) over
a secure channel to the LDS. In step 2, the LDS computes the
scalar product of the received vectors by ﬁrst applying the
multiplicative and then the additive homomorphic property of
the BGN scheme, as shown in Figure 4. For example, in a
scenario with two users, one can easily verify that
Ei(a) • Ej(b) = E(x2i + xj(T − 2xi) + x2j
+ yj(T − 2yi) + y2i + y2j mod T )
= E(d2ij mod T )
where T is chosen such that ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, d2ij < T . At
this point, the LDS has obliviously computed E(d2ij), which
is the (encrypted) square of the pairwise distances between all
pairs Li, Lj of user-desired locations, where i = j.
2) Paillier-ElGamal-distance: An alternative scheme for
the distance computation is based on both the Paillier and
ElGamal encryption schemes, as shown in Figure 5. As neither
Paillier or ElGamal possess both multiplicative and additive
properties, the resulting algorithm requires one extra step in
order to achieve the same result as the BGN-based scheme,
i.e., obliviously computing the pairwise distances d2ij . The
distances are computed as follows. In step 1, each user ui,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} creates the vector
Ei(a) =< ai1| . . . |ai4 >
=< Pai(x2i )|ElG(xi)|Pai(y2i )|ElG(yi) >
where Pai(.) and ElG(.) refer to the encryption of (.)
using the Paillier or ElGamal encryption schemes, respectively.
Afterwards, each user ui sends the vector Ei(a) to the
LDS, encrypted with LDS’s public key. In step 2.1, the LDS
computes the scalar product of the second and fourth element
of the received vectors (as shown in Figure 5). In order to hide
this intermediate result from the users, the LDS obliviously
randomizes these results with random values rs, rt. At the
same time, the LDS computes the multiplicative inverse of
such values, denoted as r−1s and r
−1
t respectively. These ran-
domized scalar products are denoted as cij,s and cij,t. In step
2.2, the LDS permutes the order of all cij,s and cij,t with its
private element-permutation function σ = [σ1, . . . , σN(N−1)],
and sends N such distinct elements to each user ui. In step
3, each user simply decrypts the received elements with the
ElGamal private key and re-encrypts them with the Paillier
public key. Then each user sends the re-encrypted elements to
the LDS in the same order as he received it. In step 4, the LDS
reverts the element-permutation function σ, and in step 4.1 it
ﬁnally computes the d2ij for all i, j, after having removed the
randomizing factors rij,s, rij,t with their inverses rij,sinv and
rij,tinv . At this point, the LDS has securely computed E(d2ij),
the (encrypted) square of the pairwise distances between all
pairs of user-desired locations Li = Lj .
As the ElGamal-Paillier based distance computation in-
volves decryption/re-encryption operations, it may be possible
for participants to maliciously change the masked values. For
instance, such an active attack could be performed in order to
disrupt the distance computations or to manipulate the result
for personal advantage (such as a personally convenient but
generally suboptimal meeting location). We discuss such active
attacks and defense mechanisms in Section VI.
D. The POML Protocol
In the previous subsections, we deﬁned all the necessary
operations and cryptographic tools that are required in order
to solve the POML problem. We now describe our algorithm
that solves the POML problem in an efﬁcient and privacy-
preserving way, as shown in Figure 6. The protocol has three
main modules: (A) the distance computation module, (B) the
MAX module and (C) the ARGMIN MAX module.
Distance computations: The ﬁrst module (distance com-
putation) uses one of the two protocols deﬁned in the previous
subsection (BGN-distance or Paillier-Elgamal distance). We
note that modules (B) and (C) use the same encryption scheme
as the one used in module (A). In other words, E(.) of Figure
6 refers to the encryption of (.) using either the BGN or the
Paillier encryption scheme. Once the distance protocol has
been decided, the next modules (B) and (C) are executed as
follows.
1. Each user i generates
Ei(a) = <ai1|...|ai4> = 
< Pai(xi2) | ElG(xi) | 
Pai(yi2) | ElG(yi) >
2.1 Server computes
For i =1...N-1
For j = i+1…N
choose random rs, rt  Zn*       
find their multipl. inv. rs-1, rt-1
rij,s = rs      ;  rij,sinv = rs-1
rij,t = rt      ;  rij,tinv = rt-1
cij,s = ai2 · aj2 · ElG(n-2rij,s)
cij,t = ai4 · aj4 · ElG(n-2rij,t)
end for
end for       
2.2 Chooses random element-permut.   
fct.  = (1,..,N(N-1)) and selects cij,. 
accordingly
Ei(a)
Users LDS
User 1
User N
1 1
| ... |
N
c c   
( 2 ) ( 1)
| ... |
N N N N
c c   
3. Each user i decrypts the    
received elements c.. using  
the ElGamal key, obtaining
F.. = DElG(c..)
and re-encrypts them using   
the Paillier encryption 
scheme, obtaining Pai(F..) 
All users
P(F.. )
4.  Server inverts the   
permutation  with -1 of        
on the received encrypted   
elements P(F)
4.1 For i =1...N-1
For j = i+1…N
cijtot = ai1·Pai(cij,s)rij,sinv·
aj1·ai3·Pai(cij,t)rij,tinv·aj3
Figure 5. Distance computation protocol based on the ElGamal and Paillier
encryption schemes.
MAX computations: In step B.1, the LDS needs to be
obliviously hide the values within the encrypted elements (i.e.,
the pairwise distances computed earlier), before sending them
to the users, in order to avoid leaking any kind of private
information such as the pairwise distance or desired locations
to any user2. In order to obliviously mask such values, for
each index i the LDS generates two random values ri, si
that are used to scale and shift the ctotij (the encrypted square
distance between Li, Lj) for all j, obtaining d∗ij . This is done
in order to (i) ensure privacy of real pairwise distances, (ii) be
resilient in case of collusion among users and (iii) preserve the
internal order (the inequalities) among the pairwise distance
from each user to all other users. Afterwards, in step B.2 the
LDS chooses two private element-permutation functions σ (for
i) and θ (for j) and permutes d∗ij , obtaining the permuted
values d∗σiθj , where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The LDS sends N such
distinct elements to each user. In step B.3, each user decrypts
the received values, determines their maximum and sends the
index σMAXi of the maximum value to the LDS. In step B.4
2We note that, after the distance computation module (A), the LDS
possesses all encrypted pairwise distances. This encryption is made with
the public key of the participants and therefore the LDS cannot decrypt the
distances without the corresponding private key. The oblivious (and order-
preserving) masking performed by the LDS at step B.1 is used in order to
hide the pairwise distances from the users themselves, as otherwise they would
be able to obtain these distances and violate the privacy of the users.
Users LDS
User 1
User N
B.1 LDS masks pairwise 
encrypted distances
For i =1...N
If ElGamal-Paillier
w = n
Else
w = T
choose random ri, si  Zw*
find ri-1
For j = 1…N
end for
end for       
B.2 LDS chooses private element-
permut. fcts.  = (1,..,N) and 
 = (1,..,N). LDS permutes 
dij* with respect to i with ,
and with respect to j with  
1 1 1
* *| ... |
N
d d    
1
* *| ... |
N N N
d d    
B. MAX computations
B.3 Each user i decrypts the 
received values d* , 
determines the MAX 
among them and stores
its index as imax
B.4 LDS inverts perm.  and , 
and removes masking 
For i = 1..N
end for
1*max · (( )) imax rii i E gc d s

 
For all i,
imax
C. ARGMIN MAX computations C.1 LDS masks MAX values
For i =1...N
choose random ri ,si   Zw*
end for
end for       
max · (( ) )irmaxi i iEd c s
* ( · () )irtotij ij id c E s
For all i,
dimax
C.2 Each user i decrypts the 
received values dimax , 
determines the min 
among them
C.3 The user with the min dimax  informs 
all participants of the final 
meeting place Lopt
User 2 2 1 2
* *| ... |
N
d d    
A. Distance computations using any of the two described protocols
Figure 6. Privacy-preserving Optimal Meeting-Location protocol (POML).
of the MAX module (B), the LDS inverts the permutation
functions σ, θ and removes the masking from the received
indexes corresponding to the maximum distance values.
ARGMIN MAX computations: In step C.1, the LDS
masks the true maximum distances by scaling and shifting
all of them by the same amount, such that their order (the
inequalities among them) is preserved. Then the LDS sends
to each user all the masked maximum distances. In step C.2
each user decrypts the received masked maximum values, and
determines the minimum value among all maxima. In step C.3,
each user knows which identiﬁer corresponds to himself, and
the user with the minimum distance sends to all other users
his desired meeting location in an anonymous way.
After the last step, each user receives the ﬁnal optimal
Table II
ASYMPTOTIC COMPLEXITY OF THE PROPOSED POML PROTOCOLS. THE
VALUES IN BOLD CORRESPOND TO THE MOST EFFICIENT PROTOCOL WITH
RESPECT TO THE GIVEN OPERATION, AND N IS THE NUMBER OF MEETING
PARTICIPANTS.
CLIENT PROTOCOL BGN (mod n) 
ELGAMAL-
PAILLIER 
(mod n2) 
Multiplication Distance O(1) O(N) POML 
Exponentiation 
Distance O() 
O(N) POML O(N)
Memory Distance O(1) O(N) POML O(N) 
Communication Distance O(1) O(N) POML O(N) 
LDS    
Multiplication, 
exponentiation 
Distance O(N2) O(N2) POML 
Bilinear mapping Distance O(N2) ------- POML 
Memory Distance O(N2) O(N2) POML 
Communication Distance O(N) O(N2) POML O(N2) 
meeting location, but no other information regarding non-
optimal locations or distances is leaked. In order to assess
the efﬁciency and to know whether the proposed POML
protocol fulﬁlls the privacy requirements deﬁned in Section
III, we present the complexity and privacy analysis in the next
subsection.
E. Analysis
Our POML protocol, shown in Figure 6, is based on
the interaction between users and a third-party LDS. Each
of these parties performs operations on both plaintext and
encrypted elements, and the resources available on the user
devices are usually lower than those of the LDS. Hereafter
we discuss the asymptotic complexities of our two distance
and POML protocols, by considering both client and LDS
computation, communication and memory complexities. We
summarize these results in Table II.
1) Client complexity: The number of multiplications for
the BGN-based distance protocol (Figure 4) is independent
on the number of participating clients (O(1)), as opposed to
the ElGamal-Paillier based protocol (O(N)). However, this
is not true for the number of exponentiations. As stated
in the seminal paper [15], a single decryption in the BGN
cryptosystem requires O(
√
T ) exponentiations, where T is the
order of the plaintext domain. This can be improved by using
pre-computation, allowing only integer comparisons (instead
of exponentiations) to successfully decrypt an element. On
the contrary, the alternative algorithm is much more efﬁcient
(O(N)) for a reasonable number N of participants (compared
to O(N
√
T )), because the number of exponentiations is inde-
pendent on the plaintext domain.
The memory requirements for the BGN-based distance
protocol (O(1)) are lower than for the alternative one (O(N)),
mainly because the former does not need to store values
(masked pairwise distances) that depend on other users’ inputs.
Similarly, the BGN-based distance protocol is more efﬁcient
(O(1) compared to O(N)). The homomorphic properties of
BGN allow for the pairwise distance computations to be
computed in a single round, avoiding unnecessary message
exchanges. However, the complete POML protocol has the
same communication complexity (O(N)) for both BGN and
ElGamal-Paillier primitives.
2) LDS complexity: Both BGN- and ElGamal-Piallier-
based POML algorithms have quadratic complexity (O(N2))
on the server side. However, the BGN scheme uses O(N2)
additional bilinear mappings in order to perform the homomor-
phic multiplication, which are expensive. These bilinear map-
pings are not required in the ElGamal-Paillier scheme. Nev-
ertheless, the exponentiation operations can be pre-computed
in BGN (because the h value is public), as opposed to the
ElGamal-Paillier-based approach.
The memory and communication requirements are also sim-
ilar for both the BGN- and ElGamal-Paillier-based protocols.
The former is, however, more efﬁcient with respect to the
number of message exchanges in the distance computation
phase (O(N)), compared to the latter (O(N2)).
3) Privacy: Informally, a POML algorithm A is private if
an adversary (participating user or LDS) does not learn the
preferred meeting locations, the mutual distances and coordi-
nate relations of any user, after A’s execution. According to the
previously outlined privacy deﬁnitions, we have the following
result.
Proposition 1: The BGN and ElGamal-Paillier based
POML algorithms are execution privacy-preserving.
In simple words, Proposition 1 states that both proposed
algorithms correctly compute the optimal meeting location,
given the received inputs, and that they do not reveal any
users’ preferred meeting locations to any other user, except
the optimal meeting location Lopt. Moreover, the LDS does
not learn any information about any user-preferred locations.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
V. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the results of the performance
measurements of our two POML algorithms, conducted on a
testbed of Nokia N810 mobile devices (Figure 7). Readers
should note that we measured only the computation time on
the devices, without the message communication delays. As
we use wireless peer-to-peer communication, such delays are
negligible. For the elliptic curve BGN-based POML algorithm,
we measured the performance of using both a 160-bit and
a 256-bit secret key, whereas for the ElGamal-Paillier based
algorithm we used the standard 1024-bit secret keys. As
mentioned in Section IV, a 160-bit key in elliptic curve
Lopt Li
Figure 7. Prototype POML application running on a Nokia N810 mobile
device. The image on the left is the main window, where users add the
desired meeting participants. The image on the right is the map that shows the
optimal meeting location (green pin, thick solid arrow) and the user-desired
meeting location (red pin, thin dashed arrow), after the execution of the POML
protocol. In this particular example, the optimal meeting location is not this
user’s preferred location, but the location preference of some other participant.
cryptosystems provides an equivalent resistance to attacks of
a 1024-bit RSA key [25].
The client devices (N810s) are based on the ARM 400 MHz
CPU and have 256 MB RAM. Their operating system is the
Linux-based Maemo OS2008, and we wrote our applications
using the Qt programming language, which is optimized for
such OS. The LDS has been implemented on a 2 GHz Intel
CPU with 3 GB RAM, running the Ubuntu 9.04 Linux.
Hereafter we discuss the main performance measurements.
A. LDS performance
Figure 8(a) shows the time required by the LDS in order to
perform the pairwise distance computations (module A of Fig-
ure 6). We can see that the computation time increases as the
number of meeting participants increases, due to the greater
quantity of pairwise distances that need to be computed. The
ElGamal-Paillier algorithm is the most efﬁcient, requiring 2
seconds to compute the distances among 10 participants. The
two BGN-based algorithms are less efﬁcient, but are still
practical enough (7 seconds) when using a comparable security
level to the ElGamal-Paillier algorithm. The CPU-intensive
bilinear mappings in BGN are certainly one important reason
for such results. This fact is even more evident when the
security parameter in BGN is increased from 160 to 256 bits.
Regarding the subsequent modules B and C of the POML
protocol, we observe a that the BGN-based algorithms out-
perform the ElGamal-Paillier one (Figure 8(b) and 8(c)). The
maximum computations on the LDS require 0.5 seconds for
the 160-bit BGN algorithm, whereas the ElGamal-Paillier
takes almost 2 seconds. A similar result can be observed for the
minimum computations. There are two main reasons for this.
First, there are no bilinear mappings involved in these modules
and second, the BGN-based algorithms use much smaller key
sizes. From a practical perspective, both the ElGamal-Paillier
and the BGN algorithms have good performance in modules
B and C of the POML protocol.
B. Client performance
Figure 8(d) shows the time required to compute the distance
(module A) on the Nokia N810 mobile device. As it can
be seen, the BGN-based algorithm is the most efﬁcient,
requiring only 0.3 seconds, compared to the 1.4 seconds of the
ElGamal-Paillier one with 2 users. Thanks to the homomorphic
properties of BGN, the pairwise distances can be obliviously
computed by the LDS, without involving any decryption/re-
encryption operation from the clients (as opposed to the
ElGamal-Paillier alternative). Even with a comparatively larger
security resistance, the BGN scheme is still faster than the
alternative one. It is also important to notice that the design
of the proposed BGN distance algorithm allows it to perform
well, independently of the number of participants.
The performance of the maximization/minimization com-
putations are shown in Figure 8(e). As it can be seen, the
performance of the BGN-based algorithm in computing such
operations (10 seconds for 10 participants) is signiﬁcantly
worse than the comparably secure ElGamal-Paillier based
algorithm (2 seconds for 10 participants). The maximiza-
tion/minimization operations require the client to decrypt the
obliviously masked pairwise distances. This is mainly due to
the complexity of this operation using the BGN cryptosys-
tem, which depends on the number of participants and the
value inside the encrypted message [15]. On the contrary,
the ElGamal-Paillier based decryptions are independent of the
value inside the encrypted message.
C. Total runtime
Figure 8(f) shows the total runtime for the client and the
LDS, computed as the sum of the time required for one
complete execution of the POML protocol (Figure 6, time for
module A + B + C), excluding the communication delays. As
it can be seen, the total runtime for both client and LDS is
lower by using the ElGamal-Paillier based POML algorithm,
compared to the BGN-based one. With 10 participants, the
former algorithm requires 6 seconds to obtain the optimal
meeting location on the clients, whereas the LDS needs 4.5
seconds. Using the BGN-based POML algorithm, each client
needs more than 20 seconds and the LDS requires approxima-
tively 8 seconds. In other words, the ElGamal-Paillier based
POML algorithm is almost two times faster than the BGN-
based one.
D. Discussion
The implementation measurement results of our two POML
algorithms show that the ElGamal-Paillier based algorithm has
a better overall performance than the BGN-based alternative.
On a comparable security level and without considering com-
munication delays, both the LDS and the client device require
less computation time for the former algorithm compared to
the latter. However, aside from the performance, the BGN-
based algorithm presents several advantages. First, it involves
three less message exchanges between each client and the
LDS (Figure 4) compared to the alternative algorithm. Second,
much shorter security parameters can be used in order to
achieve the same resistance to attacks, and thus lower the
memory requirements on the client devices. Third, mali-
cious users cannot change the masked user-preferred meeting-
location coordinates once they have been sent to the LDS, as
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Figure 8. Implementation performance measurements.
there are no decryption/re-encryption operations in the BGN-
based algorithm, as opposed to the ElGamal-Paillier based one.
In the next section, we discuss other security and optimiza-
tion issues related to the two proposed POML algorithms.
VI. EXTENSIONS
In the previous sections we presented our two POML algo-
rithms and evaluated their performance on commercial mobile
devices. In this section, we present some enhancements of the
proposed algorithms in order to better cope with malicious
attacks and to further increase the optimization properties of
the ﬁnal meeting location Lopt.
A. Security
According to Proposition 1, the two proposed POML al-
gorithms are execution privacy-preserving. In other words, no
(actually negligible) private information about users’ preferred
meeting locations or pairwise distances is leaked to any other
user or third-party LDS. However, active malicious attacks
are still possible, and we need to evaluate their feasibility and
consequences on the user-privacy. Hereafter we discuss some
possible active attacks on our POML protocols, and we present
defensive mechanisms in order to thwart them.
There are three main categories of active attacks that could
be perpetrated against our POML protocols, namely (i) the col-
lusion among users and/or LDS, (ii) the fake user generation
and/or replay attacks and (iii) preferred location modiﬁcation.
With respect to the collusion attack, there could be scenarios
where participants collude among themselves or where the
LDS colludes with some participants. In the ﬁrst case, the
colluding participants would be able to know their preferred
locations and their respective distances, but they will not
be able to infer crucial information about the honest users’
locations with certainty. Regardless of the protocol used or
the encryption methods, the published optimal result (together
with the additional information malicious users may get from
colluders) can be used to construct exclusion zones, based on
the set of equations and known parameters. An exclusion zone
is a region that does not contain any location preferences,
and the number of such exclusion zones increases with the
number of colluders. We are currently working on quantifying
this impact on our optimization and encryption methods.
However, in the unlikely case of collusion between the LDS
and the participants, the latter will be able to obtain other
participants’ preferences. In order to mitigate such a threat,
the invited participants could agree on establishing a shared
secret using techniques from threshold cryptography, such as
[26]. The LDS should then collude with at least a predeﬁned
number of participants in order to obtain the shared secret and
learn the individual preferred meeting locations. Nevertheless,
considering both malicious users and malicious LDS at the
same time is a rather strong assumption, due to the commercial
interests service providers have in guaranteeing a faithful
service to their customers.
Generating fake users can be attempted both by the LDS and
by any meeting participant, in order to disrupt or manipulate
the computations of the optimal meeting location. However,
the security of our algorithms prevents such attacks from
succeeding. In case the LDS generates fake users, it would not
be able to obtain the secret that is shared among the honest
users and which is used to derive the secret key KMvs for
each session v. This attack is more dangerous if a legitimate
participant creates a fake, because the legitimate participant
knows the shared secret. In this scenario, however, the LDS
knows the list of meeting participants (as it is computing
the optimal meeting location) and therefore it would accept
only messages digitally signed by each one of them. Replay
attacks could be thwarted by adding an individually signed
nonce, derived using the shared secret, in each user’s meeting
request and reply. These nonces would be forwarded to all
other meeting participants, who would be able to verify the
signature and check whether all received nonces are equal.
A failure in this process would suggest that there has been
tampering with the POML protocol.
The last type of active attack could lead to the determination
of a suboptimal meeting location. Maliciously modifying or
untruthfully reporting the maximum masked values (step B.3
of Figure 6) could deviate the LDS in accepting the false re-
ceived index as the maximum value, and therefore potentially
lead to the determination of a suboptimal meeting location.
However, this is rather unlikely to happen in practice. For
instance, even if in step B.3 a user falsely reports one of his
values to be the maximum when actually it is not, this would
cause the algorithm to select a suboptimal meeting location
if and only if no other user selected a smaller value as the
maximum distance.
B. Optimization
The optimal meeting location Lopt is determined based on
the k-center problem formulation (Section IV). This fairness
criterion chooses Lopt in a way to minimize the maximum
displacement from any participant’s preferred location to Lopt.
Although appropriate, individual fairness might be comple-
mented with aggregated displacement costs. For instance, min-
imizing
∑N
i=1 |Li −Lopt|2 (which is the sum of all distances
to Lopt) may be taken into consideration together with the
aforementioned fairness criterion. This would de facto force
the system to ﬁnd a compromise between the two criteria.
Such complements to the original optimality criterion can
be easily integrated in the proposed POML algorithms. For
instance, the total sum-displacement of all participants to
Lopt can be easily (and obliviously) performed by the LDS,
after the pairwise distances have been computed. Thanks to
the additive homomorphic properties of the Paillier and the
BGN cryptosystems, the sum of pairwise distances squared
is a simple operation for both schemes: it requires the LDS
to simply sum up all pairwise distances for each candidate
meeting location. Then, the LDS masks and appends these
sums to the already computed distances in step B.2 (Figure
6), and in step B.3 each client determines the maximum of
such received values, in addition to the maximum of the
masked distances squared. As the complexity of this operation
is linear, with respect to the number of preferred locations,
the proposed POML algorithms would not suffer from an
increased computational demand.
In addition to the proposed k-center formulation of the
POML problem, a different approach could be envisaged in
scenarios where participants could choose more than one
preferred meeting location, i.e., Li = {Li,1, . . . , Li,h}, and
then apply the optimization to the set of private user-preferred
locations. Alternatively, participants could propose a set of
locations that are the furthest places where they are willing to
meet. Then, given these locations, the POML problem could
be solved by constructing, for each user, the minimum convex
hull (containing each user’s set of constraints) that would
represent the region in which each user is willing to meet.
The optimal meeting location Lopt would then be deﬁned in
the intersection (if any) of the private individual convex hulls.
Depending on the context and the utilization scenario, this
geometric intersection approach to the POML problem might
be more suited than the proposed ones (based on the k-center
formulation).
VII. USER STUDY RESULTS
Based on guidelines from ([27], [28]), we prepared and
conducted a user study on 35 subjects, sampling a population
of university students, faculty members and non-scientiﬁc
staff. The goal of the study was to assess the sensitivity of
the subjects to privacy issues in meeting-location applications,
as well as to obtain feedback with respect to our prototype
application. The questionnaire was based on 32 questions.
The results show that 63% of the respondents use the
calendar/agenda on their mobile device to organize meetings.
57% of such meetings involve 4-6 participants, and only 14%
have more than 6 participants. When asked about optimal
meeting-location applications, 91% claim that they would be
at least a little interested in such applications, and among those
52% would be very interested.
With respect to privacy in such applications, 66% agree
that it is important to reveal only the necessary information to
the system, in order to compute the optimal meeting location
(Figure 9). The percentage grows to 89% if we include
respondents who tend to agree with such statement as well.
After having used our prototype application, 71% of the users
tend to or appreciate that their meeting-location preferences
were not revealed to others by the algorithm, and only 8% do
not care about the privacy of their meeting-location preference.
VIII. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work to address
the optimal meeting-location problem with privacy guarantees.
Hereafter, we ﬁrst present recent works that address, without
protecting privacy, strategies to determine the optimal meeting
location. Then, we discuss contributions in secure multiparty
computation (SMC) on point-distance computations.
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Figure 9. Extract of the user study questionnaire, regarding opinions about
privacy issues related to meeting locations, as well as our prototype applica-
tion. Note that we conducted the experiments in groups of 4-5 participants,
hence one user out of 4-5 was the one who recognized his own location as
being the optimal location. Thus the 20-25% of users who agree with the
second statement.
In their recent work, Santos and Vaughn [29] present a
survey of existing literature on meeting-location algorithms,
and propose a more comprehensive solution for such a prob-
lem. Although considering aspects such as user preferences
and constraints, their work (or the surveyed papers) does
not address any security or privacy issues. Similarly, Berger
et. al [30] propose an efﬁcient meeting-location algorithm
that considers the time in-between two consecutive meetings.
However, all private information about users is public.
In the domain of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC),
several authors have addressed privacy issues related to the
computation of the distance between two routes [31] or points
[32], [33]. Frikken and Atallah [31] propose SMC protocols
for securely computing the distance between a point and a
line segment, the distance between two moving points and
the distance between two line segments. Due to the fully
distributed nature of their protocols, the computational and
communication complexities increase signiﬁcantly with the
size of the participants and inputs. Moreover, all parties that
are involved in the computation of the mutual routes’ distances
need to be online and synchronized. Solanas and Martı´nez-
Balleste´ [33] present a distributed protocol for securely com-
puting the centroid of a set of points through a privacy
homomorphism, in order to protect users’ location privacy
from an untrusted service (LBS) provider. After the distributed
computation of the centroid location, only the LBS provider
is able to decrypt this value and deliver the service to the user.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Activity management applications are frequently used by
people in order to facilitate the planning of their daily duties.
Privately establishing common time availabilities is an impor-
tant task for all participants, and substantial research effort has
already been devoted to such a challenge.
In this work, we addressed the complementary problem
of efﬁciently and privately computing the optimal meeting
location, and presented two privacy-preserving protocols that
solve such problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst work that addresses the privacy concerns in optimal
meeting-location determination. By means of analytical eval-
uation and practical implementation on real mobile devices,
we showed that our schemes efﬁciently compute the optimal
meeting location and do not reveal any private information.
Moreover, our user-study showed that people are concerned
about sharing personal location preferences with untrusted
parties, which increases the relevance of our research efforts
and reinforces the need for further exploration. As part of our
future work, we are considering the inclusion of the extended
security and optimality criteria that we discussed in this paper,
as well as releasing to the public the source code and our
implementation, under the GPL license.
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APPENDIX A
SERVER ADVANTAGES
The server advantages are deﬁned in a similar fashion as
the user advantages. For instance, the server identiﬁability
advantage AdvIDTLDS(A) of an LDS (executing the POML
algorithm A) is deﬁned as follows.
1) Initialization: Challenger privately collects L = {Li}Ni=1,
where Li = (xi, yi) is the preferred meeting location of
user ui, and f(Li), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2) POML algorithm: LDS executes the POML algorithm A
and computes f(Lopt) = g(f(L1), . . . , f(LN )). It then
sends f(Lopt) to each user ui, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The LDS
is the adversary.
3) LDS chooses a user ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and sends i to
the challenger.
4) Challenge: Challenger chooses a random k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
and sends Lk to the LDS. The challenge is to correctly
guess whether Lk = Li.
5) The LDS sends Li∗ to the challenger. If the LDS thinks
that Lk is the preferred meeting location of user ui, i.e.,
if Lk = Li then the LDS sets Li∗ = 1. If the LDS thinks
that Lk is not the preferred meeting location of user ui,
then he sets Li∗ = 0. If Li∗ = Lk the LDS wins the
game, otherwise it loses.
The distance- and coordinate-linkability advantages of any
LDS are deﬁned similarly to the respective user advantages.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS
A. Correctness
Given the encrypted set of user-preferred locations
f(L1), . . . , f(LN ), the proposed POML algorithms compute
the pairwise distance between each pair of users dij , ∀i, j ∈
{1, . . . , N}, according to the schemes of the respective dis-
tance computation algorithms. Following the sequence of steps
for such computation, one can easily verify that the ElGamal-
Paillier based distance computation algorithm computes
Pai(d2ij) = Pai(x
2
i ) · Pai(−2xixj) · Pai(y2j )·
Pai(y2i ) · Pai(−2yiyj) · Pai(y2j )
= Pai(x2i − 2xixj + x2j + y2i − 2yiyj + y2j )
which is the same result that is achieved by the BGN-based
distance algorithm.
After the pairwise distance computations, the POML al-
gorithm computes the masking of these pairwise distances
by scaling and shifting operations. The scaling operation is
achieved by exponentiating the encrypted element to the power
of ri, where ri ∈ N∗w is a random integer and r−1i is
its multiplicative inverse. The shifting operation is done by
multiplying the encrypted element with the encryption (using
the public key of the users) of another random integer si
privately chosen by the LDS. These two algebraic operations
mask the values d2ij (within the encrypted elements), such that
the true d2ij are hidden from the users. Nevertheless, thanks
to the homomorphic properties of the encryption schemes,
the LDS is still able to remove the masking (after the users
have identiﬁed the maximum value) and correctly re-mask
all maxima, such that each user is able to correctly ﬁnd the
minimum of all maxima.
In the end, each user is able to determine Lopt where opt =
argminimaxj d
2
ij from the outputs of the POML algorithm,
and therefore the POML algorithms are correct.
B. User-privacy
Hereafter we provide sketches of the proofs of user-privacy,
after a private execution of the POML algorithm A.
1) Identiﬁability Advantage: In our submitted work we
deﬁne the identiﬁability advantage of an attacker ua as
AdvIDTa (A) = |Pr[(L∗j = 1 ∧ Lk = Lj)∪
(L∗j = 0 ∧ Lk = Lj)]− 1/(N − 1)|
where Pr[L∗j = Lk] is the probability of user ua winning the
game by correctly answering the challenge, computed over the
coinﬂips of the challenger, and 1/(N-1) is the probability of
a random guess over the N possible user-preferred locations.
Now, at the end of the POML protocol, the attacker knows
Lopt and its own preferred location La = (xa, ya) ∈ N2.
Assuming that all users other than ua have executed the
protocol correctly, ua does not know any preferred location Li,
for i = a. Therefore, the attacker has not gained any additional
knowledge from the execution of the POML algorithm with
respect to what he already knows by himself and from the
output. Hence, the probability Pr[L∗j = Lk] of him making a
correct guess j∗ about the preferred meeting location Lk of
user uk equals the probability of a random guess, which is
1/N −1. Thus, the identiﬁability advantage of the attacker ua
is negligible.
2) Distance-Linkability Advantage: The distance-
linkability of an attacker ua is deﬁned as
Advd−LNKa (A) = |Pr[(d∗ = 1] ∧ djk < s)∨
(d∗ = 0 ∧ djk ≥ s)]− 1
2
|
where Pr[.] is the probability of the adversary ua winning the
game by correctly answering the challenge, computed over the
coinﬂips of the challenger, d∗ is the guess of the adversary, djk
is the distance between Lj , Lk and s is a parameter chosen by
the challenger. In this case, the attacker has to guess whether
the distance djk between two users j, k is greater than s, and
clearly if he at some point in the protocol obtains any pairwise
distance djk, his advantage is non-negligible. However, as
explained in the correctness proof, each user gets to know
only N masked (and anonymized) values of the squares of
pairwise distances. With this information, the attacker wants
to solve a system of linear equations of the following form:⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Cσa,θ1 = ra · d2σ1,θ1 + sa
...
Cσa,θN = ra · d2σ1,θN + sa
where Cij is the received masked value of the pairwise
distances and ra, sa are random integers privately chosen
by the LDS. Hence, possessing only the knowledge of his
own preferred location and the optimal meeting location, the
attacker cannot uniquely solve this system of equation, because
it is still under-determined. Therefore, the distance-linkability
advantage of ua is negligible.
3) Coordinate-Linkability Advantage: In order to have non-
negligible coordinate-linkability advantage, an attacker ua
needs to have additional information regarding at least one
of the two coordinates of any other user’s preferred meet-
ing location. As discussed in the identiﬁability and distance
linkability advantage proofs, after a private execution of the
POML algorithm A, the attacker does not gain any additional
information about any other user’s locations. Therefore, not
knowing any other user’s coordinate, an attacker does not
gain any probabilistic advantage on correctly guessing the
relationship between their spatial coordinates. Hence, the
coordinate-linkability advantage of an attacker ua is negligible.
C. Server-privacy
All elements that are received and processed by the LDS
have previously been encrypted by the users with their com-
mon public key. In order to efﬁciently decrypt such elements,
the LDS would need to have access to the private key that has
been generated with the public key used for the encryption.
In most practical settings, where service providers have a
commercial interest in providing a faithful service to their
customers, the LDS would not try to maliciously obtain the
secret key. Therefore, all the LDS does in the POML algorithm
is to obliviously execute algebraic operation on encrypted
elements, without knowing the values within the encrypted
elements. Hence, the POML algorithms are server-private.
